The Movement Action Plan: A Strategic Framework Describing The Eight Stages of Successful Social Movements by Moyer, Bill
WellBeing International 
WBI Studies Repository 
Spring 1987 
The Movement Action Plan: A Strategic Framework Describing 
The Eight Stages of Successful Social Movements 
Bill Moyer 
Social Movement Empowerment Project 
Follow this and additional works at: https://www.wellbeingintlstudiesrepository.org/strsmov 
 Part of the Animal Studies Commons, Civic and Community Engagement Commons, and the Politics 
and Social Change Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Moyer, B. (1987). The movement action plan: A strategic framework describing the eight stages of 
successful social movements. Retrieved from http://www.historyisaweapon.com/defcon1/
moyermap.html 
This material is brought to you for free and open access 
by WellBeing International. It has been accepted for 
inclusion by an authorized administrator of the WBI 
Studies Repository. For more information, please contact 
wbisr-info@wellbeingintl.org. 
The Movement Action Plan: 
A Strategic Framework Describing The Eight Stages                    
of Successful Social Movements 
By Bill Moyer, Spring 1987 
 
 
The United States anti-nuclear energy movement was launched in the Spring of 1977, when 
1,414 Clamshell Alliance activists occupied the Seabrook nuclear power site and spent the next 
12 days in jail. During those two weeks, nuclear energy became a worldwide public issue as the 
mass media spotlight focused on the activists locked in armories throughout New Hampshire. 
Support demonstrations popped up across the United States, and in the following months 
hundreds of new grassroots anti-nuclear energy direct action groups started. 
 
The Clamshell Alliance was considered a prototype of the new movement. Activists throughout 
the country idealized the accomplishments of the Clamshell activists. They had created a new 
nationwide uprising against nuclear energy, the powerful nuclear energy industry, and the 
national government's goal (set by "Operation Independence") of 1,000 nuclear power plants by 
the turn of the century. Until then nuclear power had the public's approval and had not been a 
social issue. We wondered how on Earth they did it. I eagerly looked forward to attending the 
strategy conference in February, 1978, with 45 Clamshell organizers from around New England. 
 
That Friday night, I expected to meet a spirited, upbeat group that was proud of its 
accomplishments. I was shocked when the Clamshell activists arrived with heads bowed, 
dispirited, and depressed, saying their efforts had been in vain. After two years of hard effort, the 
Seabrook nuclear power plant was still being constructed, and Operation Independence was still 
going forward. Some people reported massive burnout and dropout; others spoke of the need for 
increased militant action, even violent guerilla actions. None believed they could rally even a 
fraction of the thousands of people they thought would be necessary to stop nuclear energy 
through the upcoming civil disobedience blockade at Seabrook in the Spring. 
 
I wondered how I could convince these activists, in my scheduled talk the next morning, that 
they were extremely successful and considered national heroes by many in the new movement. I 
stayed up most of that night creating a model framework (now called "MAP") that describes 
stages that successful social movements go through. I presented the model the next morning, 
explaining how, led by Clamshell, a new movement was created; how in one year it had achieved 
most of the goals of stage four; and how it was about to move the next stage-majority opposition. 
The stages framework helped empower many of the Clamshell activists and helped them create a 
new strategy. 
 
The Clamshell experience of discouragement and collapse is far from unusual. Within a few 
years after achieving the goals of "take-off", every major social movement of the past twenty 
years has undergone a significant collapse, in which activists believed that their movements had 
failed, the power institutions were too powerful, and their own efforts were futile. This has 
happened even when movements were actually progressing reasonably well along the normal 
path taken by past successful movements! 
 
The Movement Action Plan (MAP) was first published as the Fall 1986 edition of the Dandelion. 
Twelve-thousand copies were published and distributed. This is a revised edition of that article. 
People are invited to participate in the continuing development of MAP and help spread it to 
local groups. 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
Social movements are collective actions in which the populace is alerted, educated, and 
mobilized, over years and decades, to challenge the powerholders and the whole society to 
redress social problems or grievances and restore critical social values. By involving the 
populace directly in the political process, social movements also foster the concept of 
government of, by, and for the people. The power of movements is directly proportional to the 
forcefulness with which the grassroots exert their discontent and demand change. The central 
issue of social movements, therefore, is the struggle between the movement and the 
powerholders to win the hearts (sympathies), minds (public opinion), and active support of the 
great majority of the populace, which ultimately holds the power to either preserve the status quo 
or create change. 
 
There needs to be a revival of democracy through "people power". The increasingly centralized 
power of the state and other social institutions, combined with the new use of the mass media to 
carry out the political process, has all but eliminated effective citizen participation in the 
decision-making process. Centralized powerholders now make decisions in the interests of a 
small minority, while simultaneously undermining the common good and aggravating critical 
social problems. 
 
But people are powerful. Power ultimately resides with the populace. History is full of examples 
of an inspired citizenry involved in social movements that achieve social and political changes-
even topple tyrannical governments. Powerholders know this. They know that their power 
depends on the support or acquiescence of the mass population. 
 
Nonviolent social movements are a powerful means for preserving democracy and making 
societies address critical social problems. They enable citizens to challenge the prevailing centers 
of power and become active in society's decision-making process, especially at times when the 
normal channels for their political participation are ineffective. Social movements mobilize 
citizens and public opinion to challenge powerholders and the whole society to adhere to 
universal values and sensibilities and redress social problems. At their best, they create an 
empowered citizenry, shifting the locus of social and political power from central elites and 
institutions to new grassroots networks and groups. In recent years, social movements have 
helped establish many civil rights for Blacks and women, end the Vietnam War, curb U.S. 
military interventions, and topple dictators in Haiti and the Philippines. Presently, there are 
strong movements opposing nuclear weapons, nuclear power, South African apartheid, and U.S. 
intervention in Central America, among others. 
THE NEED FOR A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK 
How-to-do-it models and manuals provide step-by-step guidelines for most human activity, from 
baking a cake and playing tennis to having a relationship and winning a war. While there have 
been some models available for organizing nonviolent actions, based on Gandhi and King, and 
organizing communities, based on Alinsky and Ross, there have been no such analytic tools for 
evaluating and organizing social movements. 
 
The lack of a practical analytic model which describes the long process normally taken by 
successful social movements disempowers activists and limits the effectiveness of their 
movements. Without the guiding framework that explains the step-by-step process that social 
movements go through, many activists are unable to identify successes already achieved, set long 
and short term goals, confidently develop strategies, tactics, and programs, and avoid common 
pitfalls. 
 
Many experienced activists are "take-off junkies". They know how to create new social 
movements, but they do not know how to wage long-term movements that progress through a 
series of successive stages and win actual positive change. Within two years after "take-off", 
most activists inevitably perceive that their movement is failing, and their own efforts are futile. 
This leads to burnout, dropout, and the dissipation of movements. Astoundingly, this happens 
even when social movements are progressing reasonably well along the road normally taken by 
successful social movements in the past! Consequently, many activists keep repeating the cycle 
of "take-off" to "despair and burnout" with each succeeding new movement. MAP can enable 
activists to be social-change agents who help their movements progress through all the stages of 
social movements. 
 
There is another problem we hope MAP alleviates. Most social problems need to be resolved 
through changes in policies and structures at the national level. But the national power of social 
movements comes from the strength of its local groups; national social movements are only as 
powerful as their grassroots, yet grassroots groups often are unable to make a connection 
between their own efforts and what happens at the national and international level. It all seems 
too distant and unconnected. The Movement Action Plan, however, enables local activists to 
clearly see a direct connection between their own efforts and their impact at the national level. 
THE MOVEMENT ACTION PLAN (MAP) 
The Movement Action Plan provides activists with a practical, how-to-do-it analytic tool for 
evaluating and organizing social movements that are focused on national and international 
issues, such as nuclear energy and weapons, nonintervention in Central America, civil and 
human rights, AIDS, democracy and freedom, apartheid, or ecological responsibility. 
 
MAP describes eight stages through which social movements normally progress over a period of 
years and decades. For each state, MAP describes the role of the public, powerholders, and the 
movement. It provides organizers with a map of the long road of successful movements, which 
helps them guide their movement along the way. 
 
Most social movements are not just in one stage. Movements usually have many demands for 
policy changes, and their efforts for each demand are in a specific stage. The different demands 
of the Central America solidarity movement, for example, might be in the following stages: 
prevent U.S. military invasion of Nicaragua (middle of stage seven), stop aid to the contras 
(stage six), and a positive peace resolution in Central America (stage three). 
 
For each of the movement's major demands or goals, MAP enables activists to evaluate the 
movement and identify which stage it is in; identify successes already achieved; develop 
effective strategies, tactics, and programs; establish short and long-term goals; and avoid 
common pitfalls. 
 
Social movements do not fit neatly into MAP's eight stages or move through them in a linear 
way. Social movements are more dynamic. Movements have a number of different demands, and 
the effort for each demand is in a different MAP stage. When movements achieve one demand, 
they focus on achieving other demands that are at earlier stages. For example, in 1960, the civil 
rights movement's restaurant sin-in campaign successfully went through all the stages. This was 
repeated over the next years with buses and public accommodations, and it was repeated again in 
the 1965 voting rights movement, whose take-off began in March with the Selma demonstrations 
and ended in August with a Voting Rights Act. 
 
Finally, MAP is only a theoretical model, built from past experience. Real-life social movements 
will neither fit exactly nor move through the stages linearly, smoothly, or precisely in the manner 
outlined. 
 
The purpose of MAP is to give activists hope and empowerment, increase the effectiveness of 
social movements, and reduce the discouragement that often contributes to individual burnout, 
dropout, and the winding down of social movements. 
TWO VIEWS OF POWER 
Many activists simultaneously hold two contrasting models of power-power elite and people 
power. Each of these views, however, leads to opposite movement strategies and target 
constituencies. 
 
The Power Elite Model holds that society is organized in the form of a hierarchical pyramid, 
with powerful elites at the top and the relatively powerless mass populace at the bottom. The 
elites, through their dominant control of the state, institutions, laws, myths, traditions, and social 
norms, serve the interests of the elites, often to the disadvantage of the whole society. Power 
flows from the top to bottom. 
 
Since people are powerless, social change can be achieved only by appealing to the elites at the 
top to change their policies through normal channels and institutions, such as the electoral 
process, lobbying Congress, and use of the courts. The target constituency is the powerholders, 
and the method is persuasion, either convincing existing powerholders to change their view or to 
elect new powerholders. The chief opposition organizations are professional opposition 
organizations (POOs), which have national offices and staff in Washington, D.C., with regional 
offices around the country. 
 
The People Power Model holds that power ultimately resides in the mass populace. Even in 
societies with strong power elites, such as the United States or Marcos-led Philippines, the 
powerholders' power is dependent on the cooperation, acquiescence, or support of the mass 
public. This model is represented by an inverse triangle, with the people at the top and the power 
elite at the bottom. 
 
People power is the model used by social movements. The movement's strategy is not only to use 
normal channels in an effort to persuade powerholders such as President Reagan to change their 
minds, but also to alert, educate, and mobilize a discontented, impassioned, and determined 
grassroots population using nonviolent means beyond the normal parliamentary methods 
institutions. 
THE MOVEMENT'S SOURCE OF POWER 
The source of power of social movements lies in two human qualities: 
 *       A strong sense of right and wrong. People have deeply felt beliefs and values, and they 
react with extreme passion and determination when they realize that these values are violated. 
 *       We understand the world and reality, in large part, through symbolism. 
Social movements derive their power from an upset, impassioned, and motivated populace set 
into motion. This happens when people recognize that their strongly felt beliefs, values, and 
interests are unjustly violated, and the population is provided with hope that change can happen 
and a means for them to act. People are specially aroused to action when trusted public leaders, 
such as the President or Congresspeople, violate the public's trust to carry out their duties of 
office in an honest and lawful manner. 
 
The Irangate fiasco demonstrates this. Over a period of years, the administration carefully built 
up the danger of a new demon, Middle East terrorists, to scare the American people so they 
would support future U.S. military undertakings in the Middle East. Simultaneously, President 
Reagan was pictured as the nation's protector against this new demon. His image was built up as 
a strong father-Rambo and John Wayne rolled into one. The people were led to believe he will 
use every means to challenge and defeat terrorism everywhere. No deals. No compromises. 
 
Reagan's popularity soared. This popularity took a nose dive, however, beginning in November, 
1986, when Irangate expose' revealed that Reagan violated the public's trust and then lied to the 
public in an extensive cover-up. This follows the process of the demise of President Nixon 
during Watergate. 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS VS. POWERHOLDERS 
The process of achieving social change through social movements is the struggle between the 
movement and powerholders of the hearts, minds, and support (or acquiescence) of the general 
public. The powerholders advocate policies that are to the advantage of society's elites, but often 
to the disadvantage of the majority population and in violation of its strongly held values. Before 
movements begin, however, the populace is usually unaware of the problem and the violation of 
their values, but they would be very upset and easily spurred to action if they knew. This was the 
situation regarding nuclear energy before 1977, the nuclear arms race before 1980, U.S. 
intervention in Central America before 1983, and U.S. arms to Iran before the Fall of 1986. 
THE POWERHOLDER STRATEGY 
The powerholders maintain their power and the status quo by hiding the moral violations of 
social conditions and by their policies through the following strategies: 
*       The first line of defense is through a strategy of "bureaucratic management" to prevent the 
issue from becoming a public issue. This is achieved by (1) "internalized obedience," keeping the 
problem out of the public's view of the world and thereby out of people's consciousness; (2) 
keeping issues out of the public spotlight and off the society's agenda; and (3) keeping the issue 
off of society's political agenda of hotly contested issues. 
*       Some of the means used by the powerholders to achieve this strategy are the following:(1) 
maintain hegemony of information available to the public through the media; (2) deny that the 
problem exists (e.g., "no arms have been sent to Iran"); (3) create "societal myths" which define 
the problem for the public exactly the opposite of reality, such as calling the contras "freedom 
fighters" or saying that the Marcos Duvallier governments were part of the "free world"; and (4) 
create the threat of demons, such as Communism and terrorism, to install fear in the general 
population so that they will unquestioningly support whatever policies the powerholders take. 
 
*       After a policy becomes a public issue, the powerholders are forced to switch to a "crisis 
management" strategy by doing the following:(1) vindicate unjust policies through "justification 
myths", which explain that their policies are needed to overcome a bigger evil (e.g., "we need to 
support President Marcos, a minor dictator, to prevent the worse evil of the Communist takeover 
in the Philippines"); (2) re-emphasize old demons or create new ones; (3) create trigger events to 
justify a new policy and to get public consent, such as when the American Government got the 
support of the American people for escalating the Vietnam War by proclaiming that American 
ships were attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin; (4) overcome public opposition by first ignoring then 
discrediting, destabilizing, and if necessary, repressing the movement; (5) appearing to be 
involved in a resolution process through promises, new rhetoric, appointing studies and 
commissions, and negotiations, as in the Geneva nuclear arms reduction meetings; (6) make 
minor changes through reforms, compromises, and cooptation of opponents; and (7) coopt the 
opposition. 
*       The chief means by which the powerholders maintain unjust policies and keep them hidden 
from the public is by having a two-track system of "official" vs. "operative" doctrines and 
policies. (These are Noam Chomsky's terms.) Official policies are fictitious policies which are 
given to the general public. They are explained in high-sounding moral terms, such as democracy 
and freedom. Operative policies, on the other hand, are the government's actual policies, which 
are kept hidden from the public because they violate widely held values and therefore would 
upset most citizens. For example, after the Boland amendment was passed in 1984 forbidding 
U.S. governmental aid to the Nicaraguan contras, the Reagan administration adopted an official 
policy of not providing governmental aid; yet, the Irangate revelations have exposed the 
Administration's operative policy of providing massive covert government aid spearheaded by 
Ollie North and the National Security Council. 
 
 
THE MOVEMENT'S STRATEGY 
The movement's aim is to educate and win over an increasingly larger majority of the public, and 
to mobilize the majority public into an effective force that brings about social change. To achieve 
this, movements need to be grounded in the strongly felt and widely held human and cultural 
values, symbols, sensibilities, and traditions of the general population, such as freedom, 
democracy, justice, and human rights (but not those cultural values with which we disagree, such 
as the Monroe Doctrine's proclamation that the U.S. has the right to dominate Latin America). 
Only by showing the Public that the movement upholds these values, and that the powerholders 
violate them, can the population be won over and stirred to the level of passion required for them 
to act. In contrast, movement activities and attitudes that violate the society's values and 
sensibilities, including acts of violence and rebellious machismo posturing, have the opposite 
effect; they turn both the public and many other activists against the movement. 
 
The movement's strategy, mirroring that of the powerholders, needs to accomplish the following: 
*       Publicly show that the social conditions and powerholder policies violate values, traditions, 
and self-interests of the general public. This includes publicly revealing the difference between 
official and operative policies and doctrines. 
 *       Keep the issue and moral violations in the public spotlight and on society' agenda of hotly 
contested issues. 
*       Keep the issue and powerholders' policies on society's political agenda, such as having aid 
to the contras voted on in Congress rather than carried out secretly by the CIA. 
*       Counter the powerholders' social myths, justifications, and denials that the problem exists. 
*       Counter the powerholders' demonology. For example, the thousands of American "citizen 
diplomats" who visit Russia counter the Reagan demonology that the Soviets are monsters and 
an "evil empire" by revealing that the Russians are people like us. 
*       Involve increasingly larger portions of the public in programs that challenge the 
powerholders' policies and promote alternative visions and programs. 
*       Don't compromise too much too soon. 
*       After a large majority of public opinion is won, have an "endgame" strategy that mobilizes 
the populace and institutions to create change, despite the determined opposition of the central 
powerholders. 
 *       Finally the movement's organizations and leadership, especially at the national and 
regional levels, should serve, nurture, and empower the grassroots activists and promote 
participatory democracy within the movement. 
 
 
STAGE ONE: NORMAL TIMES 
In this first stage-normal times-there are many conditions that grossly violate widely held, 
cherished human values such as freedom, democracy, security, and justice, and the best interests 
of society as a whole. Moreover, these conditions are maintained by the policies of public and 
private powerholders, and a majority of public opinion. Yet, these violations of values, 
sensibilities, and self-interest of the general society are relatively unnoticed; they are neither in 
the public spotlight nor on society's agenda of hotly contested issues. Normal times are 
politically quiet times. Some past normal times were the violations of Blacks' civil rights before 
1960; the Vietnam War before 1967; and U.S. intervention in Central America and support for 
Marcos, Duvalier, and apartheid before 1985. 
 
Opposition 
The opposition of these conditions and policies is small and receives more public ridicule than 
support. Consequently, its efforts are relatively ineffective. There are three major kinds of 
opposition: professional opposition organizations (POOs), ideological or principled dissent 
groups, and grassroots groups that represent the victims. 
 
The professional opposition organizations are centralized formal organizations, often with 
national offices in Washington, D.C., which try to win achievable reforms through mainstream 
political channels such as the electoral process, Congress, and the courts. They are hierarchical, 
with a board of directors, strong staff, and a mass membership that carries out nationally decided 
programs. These efforts have little success because they do not have sufficient public support to 
provide the political clout required to create change. 
 
The principled dissent groups hold nonviolent demonstrations, rallies, pickets, and occasional 
civil disobedience actions. These groups are usually small, little noticed, and ineffective at 
achieving their demands. Through their symbolic actions, however, the principled dissent groups 
are a shining moral light in the darkness. 
 
The grassroots groups are composed of local citizens who oppose present conditions and policies 
but do not yet have the support of the majority local population. They represent the victims' 
perspective, provide direct services to victims, and also carry out programs similar to those of the 
other opposition groups. 
 
Powerholders 
The powerholders often promote policies that support the interests of society's privileged and 
powerful, and which violate the interests and values of the society as a whole. The powerholders 
maintain these policies primarily by keeping them out of the public spotlight and off the society's 
agenda of contested issues. They have to keep these policies hidden from the general public 
because they know that the populace would be upset and demand changes if they knew the truth. 
The powerholders are able to maintain these policies and keep them hidden from the public by 
successfully carrying out their two-tact strategy of highly proclaiming their official doctrine and 
policies, stated in terms of the society's values and interests, while hiding from the public their 
actual or operative doctrines and policies. 
 
Public 
A political and social consensus supports the powerholders' official policies and status quo 
because the public does not know that the government is actually functioning according to the 
opposite operative doctrine policies. Consequently, the general populace is unaware that the 
social conditions and public policies violate their values and self interests; or, when they do 
know, they believe the justifications as to why they can't be changed or are needed to protect a 
higher cause or value. As a result, the public is not aware that there is a serious problem. 
Possibly only 10 to 15 percent of the population disagrees with the powerholders' policies. 
 
Goals 
The goals at this stage are: 
 *       to document that a serious problem exists, 
 *       to maintain an active opposition no matter how small, and 
 *       to move to the next stages. 
 
Pitfalls 
The main danger is to be stuck in normal times indefinitely because of political naiveté, not 
knowing the realities of political and social life, and feeling powerless to create change. 
 
Conclusion 
Normal times are politically quiet times because the powerholders successfully promote their 
official doctrine and policies while hiding their actual operative doctrine and policies, thereby 
keeping the violations of conditions and their policies out of the public consciousness and off 
society's agenda. The opposition feels hopeless because it seems that the situation will continue 
indefinitely, and they feel powerless to change it. Beneath the calm surface, however, the 
contradictions between society's values and the powerholders' actual, operative policies hold the 
seeds for popular discontent that can create dramatic changes. 
 
CASE STUDY: THE AMERICAN ANTI-NUCLEAR ENERGY MOVEMENT 
Stage One - 1940s to 1960s 
 
The American government launched the nuclear weapons era in the 1940s to fulfill its new role 
as the dominant world power. This was followed within a few years by the nuclear energy era. 
Although it was given lots of media hype as the "peaceful atom", there was virtually no public 
discussion and debate regarding the merits of the new energy policy. The public heard only the 
official policy that nuclear energy was a modern miracle which would provide clean, safe, and 
unlimited electricity that was too cheap to meter. 
 
The operative policy was that the full government apparatus had to provide massive financial, 
legal, and developmental support to make nuclear energy possible. At the same time, all the 
information that nuclear energy was actually dangerous, dirty, unbelievably expensive, 
unnecessary, and finite, was suppressed. The public was not told about the nuclear accident at 
Detroit's Fermi reactor in 1966, which was similar to the later accident at Three Mile Island. 
 
The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was the official governmental watchdog agency 
assigned to look after the public's welfare. Instead, it promoted nuclear energy at all costs, 
overriding laws, rules, costs, and safety while suppressing all opposition. Nevertheless, public 
opposition managed to stop some of the more outrageous plans, such as nuclear dumping in Cape 
Cod and a nuclear reactor in Queens. Moreover, a ballot referendum stopped a nuclear plant in 
Eugene, Oregon. 
 
A national consensus supported the powerholders' dreams of a glowing nuclear energy future. 
Nuclear energy was not a public issue on society's agenda, for information supporting the official 
policies dominated information received by the public. 
 
STAGE TWO: PROVE THE FAILURE OF INSTITUTIONS 
The intensity of public feeling, opinion, and upset required for social movements to occur can 
happen only when the public realizes that the governmental policies violate widely held beliefs 
and values. The public's upset becomes especially intensified when official authorities violate the 
public trust by using the power of office to deceive the public and govern unfairly and 
unlawfully. Hannah Arendt wrote that "people are more likely driven to action by the unveiling 
of hypocrisy than the prevailing conditions."This was clearly shown by the dramatic turnaround 
of the American public's opinion of President Reagan after Irangate exposed that instead of 
acting on his official policy of leading the world's defiant fight against terrorists, his operative 
policy was actually cooperating, supporting, and making deals with terrorists. 
 
Opposition 
The opposition must prove both that the problem exists and that the official powerholders and 
institutions perpetuate the problem. Therefore, the opposition must: 
*       Undertake research to prove that a problem exists which violates social values and 
sensibilities. 
*       Prove that the official doctrine and policies of governmental powerholders and institutions 
violate society's values and the public trust. This must be not only from researching the facts but 
also from actually trying every avenue for official citizen participation in the democratic process 
for deciding on social policies and programs, and proving that they do not work. 
 
*       Testify, undertake challenges, and file complaints in every branch of the bureaucratic 
machinery at the local, state, and federal level of both public and private bodies that are supposed 
to be open for citizen participation and redress. 
*       Prove that they are "kangaroo courts". Go to every decision-making body whether welcome 
or not. 
*       File suit in the courts. 
*       Take their concerns to city council, state assembly, and national Congress. These programs 
are usually primarily carried out through the auspices of professional opposition organizations. 
Positive results are not expected now. The point is not to win the cases, but to prove that the 
powerholders are preventing the democratic system from working. Eventually, however, some of 
these cases might actually be won and have the powerful impact of creating a movement and 
social change. After twenty years in the courts, for example, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund's 
case of Brown vs. U.S. was won in the Supreme Court in 1954. It established the principle that 
"separate but equal" was no longer the law of the land, which became a legal basis for the civil 
rights movement. 
Powerholders 
The powerholders fight the opposition through the normal channels, usually winning easily while 
continuing their operative policies and programs. The powerholders do not feel much threatened 
or concerned, and they handle the situation as a problem of bureaucratic management rather than 
a crisis of public confidence and power. Through the mass media, they easily promote their 
official policies while hiding their operative policies thus successfully keeping the whole 




Public opinion and social consensus continues to support the government's official policies and 
status quo, as the consciousness of the general population remains unchanged. Yet, even the low 
level of evolving conditions and opposition causes public opinion against these policies to rise 
from about 10 to 20 percent. Except for the rare media coverage of opponents' activities, the 
problem is still neither in the public spotlight nor on society's agenda of contested issues. 
 
Goals 
*       Document the problem, including the involvement of the powerholders. 
*       Document the citizens' attempt to use the normal channels of citizen participation and 
prove that they did not work. 
*       Become experts. 
*       Build small opposition organizations. 
 
Pitfalls 
  *       Holding the belief that social problems can be corrected by POOs using mainstream 
institutions and methods without building a new social consensus, mobilizing widespread 
grassroots opposition, and engaging in a long struggle, which uses extra-parliamentary 
nonviolent action that changes the present imbalance of power. 
*       Continuing to feel powerless and hopeless. 
 
Conclusion 
This stage can be particularly disheartening. The problem and the policies of powerholders 
continue unabated, there is little dissent or publicity, and the situation seems like it might 
continue indefinitely-as indeed it might. Yet the efforts of this stage can eventually be used to 
prove that the emperor has no clothes and is a prerequisite for any future social movement. 
Nevertheless, this stage is for the stout-hearted, determined, and persistent. 
CASE STUDY: THE AMERICAN ANTI-NUCLEAR ENERGY MOVEMENT 
Stage Two - 1970 to 1974 
The nuclear energy era moved rapidly in the early 1970s. There were more than 25 new reactor 
orders each year. By the end of 1974, the number of operating reactors grew to 52, and the total 
number of reactors operating, ordered, and under construction leapt to 260. 
 
It seemed that the nuclear era was well on its way to achieving the government's goal of 1,000 
operating plants by the year 2000. A total social and political consensus supported the nuclear 
era's official policies and objectives, new reactor orders were pouring in, and the problems 
regarding nuclear energy were kept out of the public spotlight and society's agenda hotly 
contested issues. 
 
There was, however, a tremendous growth of citizen opposition, though still relatively small and 
unnoticed. Independent grassroots groups of local citizens sprang up around many of the new 
reactor sites. They challenged the building of the reactors in long and laborious AEC licensing 
hearings, which were held both locally and on Capitol Hill. While these efforts were essentially 
futile, they proved that the AEC hearings were a "kangaroo court", they documented the 
overwhelming negative aspects of nuclear energy, and they made experts out of local citizens. 
The hearings began being held at local reactor sites; and statewide citizen initiatives were held. 
Although most of these initiatives lost by a two-to-one margin, they served to educate the public 
and build opposition. 
 
The public still mainly supported nuclear power and was little aware of its problems. Yet, public 
opinion against nuclear energy grew 20 to 30 percent, as measured by the results of the 
referenda. 
 
STAGE THREE: RIPENING CONDITIONS 
The "take-off" of a new social movement requires preconditions that build up over many years. 
These conditions include broad historic developments, a growing discontented population of 
victims and allies, and a budding autonomous grassroots opposition, all of which encourage 
discontent with the present conditions, raise expectations that they can change, and provide the 
means to do it. 
 
The historical forces are usually long-term, broad trends and events that worsen the problem, 
upset subpopulations, raise expectations, promote the means for new activism, and personify the 
problem. They are mostly outside the control of the opposition. For example, some of the 
historical forces that made the 1960s ripe for the Black civil rights movement included the 
emergence of independent Black African countries, the large Northern migration of Blacks who 
maintained their ties to the segregated South, the rising black college student population, and the 
1954 Supreme Court's Brown vs. U.S. decision that provided a legal basis for full civil rights. 
 
Opposition 
A tremendous unheralded ripening process happens within the opposition: 
*       There needs to be a growing consciousness and discontent among subpopulations of 
victims and their allies, providing them with a new level of understanding about the seriousness 
of the problem, the values violations, how they are affected, and the illicit involvement of the 
powerholders and their institutions. The discontent can be caused by (1) either perceived or real 
worsening conditions, which creates many new victims, such as in the 1970s when hundreds of 
new atomic plant sites upset millions of Americans who lived nearby; (2) rising expectations, as 
when the new wave of Black college students felt themselves to be full citizens but were refused 
the simple civil rights of service at local lunch counters; or (3) personalization of the problem, in 
which the problem is revealed through the experience of real victims, as when four church 
women were killed in El Salvador in 1980. 
*       The growing numbers of discontented local people across the country quietly start new 
autonomous local groups, which as a whole form a "new wave" of grassroots opposition, which 
is independent from the established POOs. These groups soon become frustrated with the official 
institutions, channels, and powerholders, which they realize are totally biased in support of the 
status quo; and they become The Movement Action Plan 15 increasingly upset with some of the 
established POOs, whom they see as working in a dead-end process with the powerholders. 
*       Small local prototype demonstrations and nonviolent action campaigns begin to dramatize 
the problem, put a dim public spotlight on it, and set a precedent for future actions. 
*       A few key facilitator-visionaries provide the new-wave local opposition with information, 
ideology, training, networking, hope, and a vision of a rising opposition. 
*       Pre-existing networks and groups, which can provide support, solidarity, and participants 
for a new movement, need to become available to be used in the new movement. The 
nonintervention movement, for example, had available for its take-off church networks, which 
had lots of experience in Central America, and activists who had been in the nuclear weapons 
and energy movements, both of which had just got out of their own take-off stages. 
 
Powerholders 
Though irritated, the powerholders remain relatively unconcerned, believing that they can 
continue to contain the opposition through management of mainstream social, political, and 
communications institutions. The official policies remain publicly believed and unchallenged, 
and the operative policies continue to be hidden from the general populace. 
 
Public 
A public consensus to support the powerholders' policies, and the problem remains off society's 
agenda. Yet, the growing public awareness of the problem, discontent, and new wave opposition, 
primarily at the local level, quietly raises the public opinion opposing current powerholder 
policies to 30 percent, even though the issue remains off society's agenda. 
 
Goals 
The purpose of this stage is to help create the conditions for the take-off of a social movement. 
The goals are: 
*       Recognize historical conditions that help make a new movement possible. 
*       Create, inspire, and prepare the new wave groups, including the formation of new 
networks, leadership, and expertise that will spearhead the new movement. 
*       Prepare pre-existing networks to be concerned about the issue and involved in the 
upcoming movement. 
*       Personalize the problem. 
*       Begin a small prototype nonviolent action project. 
 
Pitfalls 
Some of the key hazards of this stage include: 
*       Not recognizing the ripening conditions for a new social movements. 
*       Having the bureaucracy, legalism, and centralized power of the POOs squash the creativity, 
independence, nonviolent methods, and spontaneity of the new grassroots groups. 
 
Conclusions 
The stage is set for new social movement. There is a critical problem that appears to be 
worsening, proven violations by the powerholders, many victims, spreading discontent, historical 
conditions, available pre-existing networks, and an emerging new wave of grassroots opposition. 
Yet, no one-the public, powerholders, or even the new wave activists-is expecting the emergence 
of a new movement. 
CASE STUDY: THE AMERICAN ANTI-NUCLEAR ENERGY MOVEMENT 
Stage Three - 1975 to 1976 
Conditions were ripening for the take-off of a new social movement. Tens of millions of citizens 
learned that they had become personally susceptible to the costs and dangers of nuclear energy 
because they lived within 50 miles of a new reactor. The grassroots local opposition groups 
quietly grew in size and number and became increasingly frustrated as the official government 
institution, the AEC, repeatedly violated its own rules and ignored reasonable citizen concerns in 
its support of nuclear energy. The increasing number of local groups grew into a substantial new 
wave of opposition. 
 
The opposition organized statewide referenda in 1976, and although they lost in seven out of 
eight states, the process served to educate the public and to raise public debate. Moreover, the 
Missouri referenda won by a two-to-one margin. This was a severe blow to the nuclear industry 
because it ended the state CWIP law, which allowed utilities to collect the costs for building 
reactors from ratepayers in their monthly electric bills. The movement then began getting these 
laws changed in most states, thereby undercutting the major means by which utilities were going 
to pay to build the hundreds of new reactors. 
 
Other ripening signs included: 
*       The end of the Vietnam War in 1975 made anti-war activists and networks available for a 
new movement. 
*       The temporary success of the occupation of the Whyl, Germany, nuclear plant site by 
25,000 citizens provided an inspiring method of nonviolent resistance. 
*       In the Spring of 1976, the AEC local hearing decided to license the Seabrook, New 
Hampshire, nuclear plant construction plans, ignoring the overwhelming legal arguments against 
it. A few weeks later, the Clamshell Alliance held the first civil disobedience occupation of a 
nuclear plant site. Inspired by the Whyl mass blockade, Clamshell announced it would organize a 
mass blockade the next Spring. 
Little noticed by either the movement or the public; however, there were only six new orders and 
over 20 cancellations of reactors already on order, dropping the total number of plants operating 
and under construction from 260 to 237. The government reduced its planned number of 
operating reactors for the year 2000 to 500. Still, the nuclear opponents held little hope for 
stopping nuclear energy. The ripening conditions seemed far short of what would be necessary to 
stop the apparent expansion of the nuclear industry. The government and electric utility industry 
continued their operative policies of publicizing the glories of reactors, and in these two years 10 
new operating reactors brought the total number of "deployed" reactors to 62. Although public 
opposition rose to about 30 percent, nuclear energy still was not on society's agenda and was 
supported by the public consensus. 
 
 
STAGE FOUR: SOCIAL MOVEMENT TAKE-OFF 
New social movements surprise and shock everyone when they burst into the public spotlight on 
the evening TV news and in newspaper headlines. Overnight, a previously unrecognized social 
problem becomes a social issue that everyone is talking about. It starts with a highly publicized, 
shocking incident, a "trigger event", followed by a nonviolent action campaign that includes 
large rallies and dramatic civil disobedience. Soon these are repeated in local communities 
around the country. 
 
The trigger event is a shocking incident that dramatically reveals a critical social problem to the 
general public in a new and vivid way, such as the arrest of Rosa Parks for refusing to move to 
the back of a Montgomery bus in 1955, NATO's 1979 announcement to deploy American Cruise 
and Pershing 2 nuclear weapons in Europe, or the Marcos government's shooting of Ninoy 
Aquino as he arrived at the Manila airport in 1983. Trigger events can be deliberate acts by 
individuals, governments, or the opponents, or they can be accidents. 
 
By starkly revealing to the public that a social condition and powerholder policies blatantly 
violate widely held cherished social values, citizen self-interest, and the public trust, the trigger 
event instills a profound sense of moral outrage in the general populace. Consequently, the 
general population responds with great passion, demanding an explanation from the 
powerholders and ready to hear more information from the opposition. The trigger event is also a 
trumpet's call to action for the new wave opposition groups around the country. 
 
Opposition 
A new social movement is created only when the opposition organizes a dramatic nonviolent 
action campaign immediately following the trigger event and when the nonviolent action 
campaign is repeated in local areas across the country. The nonviolent action campaign keeps the 
public spotlight on the problem and builds social tension over time. This "politics as theater" 
process becomes a social crisis, which turns the problem into a public issue. The shooting of 
Aquino, for example, was followed the next week by a million people in a Marcos-banned 
funeral march down the streets of Manila, and the NATO Cruise and Pershing 2 decision was 
followed by gigantic protest demonstrations in the capitols of Europe. 
 
The success of nonviolent action campaigns is based on sociodrama demonstrations. Sociodrama 
demonstrations are simple demonstrations that: 
*       are dramatic and exciting; 
*       enable demonstrators to put themselves into the key points where the powerholders carry 
out their policies; 
*       clearly reveal the values violations by the powerholders; 
*       show the movement supporting and representing the values, symbols, myths, and traditions 
of the society; and 
*       are repeatable in local communities across the country. 
These are dilemma demonstrations in which the powerholders lose regardless of their reaction. If 
they ignore the demonstrators, the policies are prevented from being carried out. If, on the other 
hand, the demonstrators are harassed or arrested, it puts public sympathy on the side of the 
demonstrators and against the powerholders. For example, during the sit-ins when Blacks sat at 
the lunch counters to eat, if angry white crowds attacked them or the police arrested them, the 
public got upset and sided with the demonstrators; if the police did nothing, the Blacks would 
either have to be served or, just by sitting there, prevent business as usual. 
 
The new movement takes off as the nonviolent action campaigns are their sociodrama actions are 
repeated in local communities throughout the country. The demonstrations in Manila, for 
example, were followed by demonstration throughout the Philippines. The 1977 Seabrook 
reactor occupation created immediate spontaneous support demonstrations across the country, 
and, within months, hundreds of new grassroots antinuclear energy groups started up, who soon 
began occupying their own local nuclear power plants. 
 
Scores of new independent local action groups spring into being, forming a new wave 
decentralized grassroots autonomous opposition that is based on non violent resistance. 
Movement take-off is the result of thousands of people across the country taking spontaneous 
actions and forming new protest groups (or revitalizing old ones). These new groups usually 
adopt loose organizational structures that are based on direct participatory democracy, little 
formal structure, and loosely defined membership. Together these groups form a new wave of 
movement because they are a new force and are not connected to either the established POOs or 
principled dissent organizations. Why do social movements take off? Some of the reasons why 
movements take off are: 
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*       The public, altered by the mass media because of the trigger event and nonviolent action 
campaigns, is outraged by the contradiction between its values and the social conditions and 
powerholders' operative policies. 
*       The new movement groups join the powerholders as the keepers of society's values and 
symbols. 
*       The new climate of social crisis gives hope and inspires action by many citizens. 
*       The repeatability of the nonviolent action campaign is local areas provides grassroots 
activists with an effective means for involvement, which they believe can be effective. 
*       Participation in the new movement gives meaning to many peoples' lives because it gives 
them an opportunity to act out their beliefs, feelings, and spirituality. 
 
Powerholders 
The powerholders are shocked, upset, and angry. They realize that the genie is out of the bottle. 
They have lost on the first law of political control: keep issues out of people's consciousness and 
the public spotlight, and off society's agendas. They take a hard line in defending their policies 
and criticizing the new movement, calling it radical, irresponsible, and even communist-inspired. 
While some liberal politicians support the movement's position, mainstream Republicans and 
Democrats alike continue to support existing government policies. 
 
Public 
Within a year or two, public opinion opposing government operative policies rapidly grows from 
30 percent of 50 percent, as for the first time the general populace sees the operative policies and 
hears views countering those of the powerholders. The public is upset and concerned by the stark 
contrast between what they see and hear in the news and what the government tells them. That is, 
they begin to see for the first time the difference between the official and operative policies 
revealed to them by the trigger event and the movement. 
 
Goals 
The overall goal of this stage is to get the whole society to begin seeing, thinking, and acting on 
the social problem. A movement take-off gets the whole society moving on the issue. The 
specific goals are: 
*       Create a new grassroots-based social movement. 
*       Put the powerholders' policies in the public consciousness and spotlight and on society's 
agenda of contentious public issues. 
*       Create a public platform for the movement to educate the populace. 
*       Create public dissonance on the issue. That is, force the general population to have to think 
about the issue by having two contradictory views of reality presented to them constantly. 
*       Win the sympathies and the opinions of the public. 
*       Become recognized as the legitimate opposition. Getting the powerholders to change their 
minds and policies is not a goal of this stage! 
 
Pitfalls 
The main pitfalls of this stage are: 
*       political naivete; 
*       burnout from overwork, not seeing progress as success, and unrealistic expectations of 
immediate victory; and 
*       arrogant self-righteousness and radicalism. 
 
Conclusion 
The take-off stage is an exciting time of trigger event, dramatic actions, passion, a new social 
movement, public spotlight, crisis, high hopes and output of energy. Both a previously 
unrecognized social problem and official policies become a public issue, and within two years a 
majority public opinion is won. But take-off is the shortest stage. After relatively rapidly 
achieving the goals of this stage, the movement progresses to Stage Six. However, many activists 
don't recognize this success. Instead, they believe that the movement has failed and their own 
efforts have been futile; consequently, they move to Stage Five. 
CASE STUDY: THE AMERICAN ANTI-NUCLEAR ENERGY MOVEMENT 
Stage Four: 1977 – 1978 
The nuclear power opposition turned into a social movement in the Spring of 1977. the arrest and 
jailing for two weeks of 1,414 Clamshell Alliance protesters who were blockading the Seabrook 
nuclear power construction site served as the trigger event, putting this issue in the worldwide 
media spotlight for weeks. Support demonstrations sprung up across the country while the 
protesters were still in jail. National media interviewed the jailed protesters daily, providing them 
with a platform for educating the public and becoming recognized as a legitimate opposition. 
Moreover, by the end of the year, the Seabrook action inspired the formation of a new local anti-
nuclear groups and similar blockade actions across the country, launching a new anti-nuclear 
energy social movement led by the new wave of local independent groups. 
 
By 1978, local and state referenda went against nuclear energy in a number of places. Kern 
County, California, reversed the two-to-one vote of 1976, rejecting the planned Wasco nuclear 
plant. New Hampshire voted against CWIP and voted out pro-nuclear, anti-Clamshell incumbent 
Governor Thompson. Public opinion rose to about 50 percent against nuclear energy. 
 
The nuclear industry again appeared to be advancing nicely, as the number of operating plants 
rose to 71. But there were no new nuclear reactor orders, and 21 reactors already under 
construction were cancelled, drastically reducing the total number of reactors operating under 
construction to 195. The powerholders took a hard line in support of nuclear, warned of future 
blackouts and a weakened America, and attacked the new movement as violent, naive, and anti-
American. 
 
The opposition successfully created a new social movement through nonviolent actions, became 
recognized as legitimate, educated the general public, and put nuclear energy in the public 
spotlight and on society's agenda. 
STAGE FIVE: IDENTITY CRISIS OF POWERLESSNESS 
After a year or two, the high hopes of movement take-off seems inevitably to turn into despair. 
Most activists lose their faith that success is just around the corner and come to believe that it is 
never going to happen. They perceive that the powerholders are too strong, their movement has 
failed, and their own efforts have been futile. Most surprising is the fact that this identity crisis of 
powerlessness and failure happens when the movement is outrageously successful-when the 
movement has just achieved all of the goals of the take-off stage within two years. This stage of 
feelings of self-identity crisis and powerlessness occurs simultaneously with Stage Six because 
the movement as a whole has progressed to the majority stage. 
 
Opposition 
Belief that the movement is failing 
Many activists conclude that their movement is failing because they believe that: 
*       The movement has not achieved its goals. After two years of hard effort, which included 
big demonstrations, dramatic civil disobedience, arrests, court scenes and even time in jail, 
media attention, and even winning a majority of public opinion against the powerholders' 
policies, the movement has not achieved any of its goals. The government is still waging the war 
in Vietnam, building five nuclear weapons a day, or sending aid to the contras. The problem, 
however, is not that the movement has failed to achieve its goals, but that expectations that its 
goal could possibly be achieved in such a short time were unrealistic. Achieving changes in 
public policies in the face of determined opposition of the powerholders takes time, often 
decades. 
*       Judging that the movement has failed because it has not achieved its goals after two years 
is analogous to parents criticizing their daughter for not graduating after completing two years in 
college with straight "A" grades. Parents don't do this because they know that achieving a B.S. 
degree is a four-year process. The movement, therefore should be judged not by whether it has 
won yet, but by how well it is progressing along the road of success. 
*       The movement has not had any "real" victories. This view is unable to accept the progress 
that the movement has made along the road of success, such as creating a massive grassroots-
based social movement, putting the issue on society's agenda, or winning a majority of public 
opinion. Ironically, involvement in the movement tends to reduce activists' ability to identify 
short-term successes. Through the movement, activists learn about the enormity of the problem, 
the agonizing suffering of the victims, and the complicity of powerholders. The intensity of this 
experience tends to increase despair and the unwillingness to accept any short-term success short 
of achieving ultimate goals. "What difference does it make that a majority of the American 
people and Congress oppose contra aid, when people are still being killed in Central America?" 
This is another version of judging the movement for not having achieved its ultimate goals rather 
than by whether it is making reasonable progress along the road. 
 
*       The power holders seem too powerful-they have not changed either their minds or their 
policies, but defiantly proclaim them louder than ever, totally ignoring the protests of the 
movement and the objections of half of the populace. The failure of the central powerholders to 
change either their minds or policies is a poor indicator of the movement's progress. The central 
powerholders will be the last segment of society to change their minds and policies. The longer 
that the public sees that the powerholders are violating social values and ignoring the democratic 
majority opinion, the higher the political costs to the powerholders for continuing those policies. 
Continued used public exposure of the powerholders upholding these policies in the face of 
public opinion, therefore, can be an indicator that the powerholders' original goal of keeping the 
issue out of public consciousness and off the society's agenda is failing. For example, with 
increasing worldwide media coverage of President Botha's proclamations of apartheid and the 
effects of this policy, the world's resistance to apartheid increases. 
*       The movement is dead because it no longer looks like the take-off stage. The image that 
most people have of successful social movement is that of the take-off stage-giant 
demonstrations, civil disobedience, media hype, crisis, and constant political theater-but this is 
always short-lived. Movements that are successful in take-off soon progress to the much more 
powerful but more sedate-appearing majority stage, as described in the next section. Although 
movements in the majority stage appear to be smaller and less effective as they move from a 
national to local focus, and from mass actions to less visible grassroots organizing, they actually 
undergo enormous growth in size and power. The power of the invisible grassroots provide the 
power of national social movements. 
*       The powerholders and mass media report that the movement is dead, irrelevant, or non-
existent. The powerholders and mass media not only report that the movement is failing, but they 
also refuse to acknowledge that a massive popular movement exists. Large demonstrations and 
majority public opposition are dismissed as "vaguely reminiscent of the Sixties", rather than 
recognized as social movements at least as big and relevant as those 20 years ago. And when 
movements do succeed, they are not given credit. The demise of nuclear energy is said to be 
caused by cost overruns, high lending rates, lack of safety, Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, 
rather than from the political and public opposition created by the people power. 
 
Battle Fatigue 
By the end of take-off, many activists suffer from "battle fatigue". After two years of virtual 
'round-the-clock activity in a crisis atmosphere, at great personal sacrifice, many activists find 
themselves mentally and physically exhausted and don't see anything to show for it. Out of quilt 
or an extreme sense of urgency, many are unable to pace themselves with adequate rest, fun, 
leisure, and attendance to personal business. Eventually, large numbers of activists who were 
part of movement take-off lose hope and a sense of purpose; they become depressed, burn out, 
and drop out. 
 
Stuck in Protest 
Another reason why many activists become depressed at this time is that they are unable to 
switch from protesting against authority in a crisis atmosphere to waging long-term struggle to 
achieve positive changes. Many activists are unable to switch their view of the process of success 
from one of mass demonstrations to that of winning the majority of public through long-term 
grassroots organizing. Consequently, being active in Stage Six feels like they are abandoning the 
movement. In addition, many principled dissenters believe that the majority stage movement is 
not pure enough. The new movement organizations are seen as a new oppressive authority. Many 
other activists originally joined the movement assuming it was a short-term time of crisis and are 
not prepared for long-term involvement. Finally, another reason why many activists are unable to 
switch to Stage Six is that they do not have the knowledge or skills required to understand or 
participate in the majority stage. For example, nonviolence trainers play a critical leadership and 
teaching role during the take-off stage, but virtually disappear in the majority stage because they 
lack the understanding and skills to train activists to participate in this stage. 
 
Rebelliousness, machismo, and more "militant" action and violence are some of the negative 
effects of feelings of despair and powerlessness. 
 
Some activists at this time adopt more militant, even violent, actions. They believe the 
nonviolent methods used to date have failed because they were too weak. New splinter groups 
are started to carry out the militant strategy, such as the Committee for Direct Action at Seabrook 
in 1979. These efforts are often reckless and defiant acts of despair, frustration and rage, which 
stem from the collapse of unrealistic expectations that the movement should have achieved its 
goals within the first two years. Because they turn off both other activists and the general public, 
militant actions invariably do more harm than good. These methods are also advocated by 
outside groups who want to use the movements to pursue their own ends, or by agent 
provocateurs. 
 
The movement needs to make deliberate effort to undercut this problem. First, it needs to reduce 
the feelings of despair and disempowerment by providing activists with a long term strategic 
framework, such as MAP, which helps them realize that they are powerful and winning, not 
losing. Also, it is important that the movement adopt clear guidelines of total nonviolence, which 
are widely publicized and agreed to by all groups and activists which officially participate in the 
movement. The nonviolent policy must be enforced by having nonviolent guidelines and training 
for all demonstration participants, and by having adequate "peacekeeping" at all demonstrations. 
 
Widespread Burnout 
The feelings of failure and exhaustion, the organizational crisis, the calls for militant actions, 




The loose organizational model of the new wave local organizations begins to become a liability 
after six months. The loose structure promoted the flexibility, creativity, participatory 
democracy, independence, and solidarity needed for quick decisions and nonviolent actions 
during take-off. But after six months, the loose organizational structures tend to cause excessive 
inefficiency, participant burnout, and an informal hierarchy. 
 
Toward Empowerment 
Movement activists need to realize what the powerholders already know-that power ultimately 
lies with the people, not the powerholders. They need to recognize the power and success of 
social movements-including their own. Some ways in which activists can overcome their identity 
crisis of disempowerment are the following: 
*       Use an analytic framework of successful social movements, such as MAP, to evaluate their 
movement, identify successes, and set strategy and tactics. 
*       Form personal/political support groups that enable activists to participate in movements as 
holistic human beings, take care of their personal needs, reduce guilt, have fun, and provide 
support (and challenge) in doing political analysis and work. 
*       Adopt a strict policy of nonviolence. 
*       Adopt "empowerment" models of organization and leadership at both the national and local 
levels. The empowerment model is a third way that tries to maximize the positive and minimize 
the negatives of both the hierarchical and the loose models, trying to blend participatory 
democracy, efficiency, personal support, and effectiveness. This model of leadership more 
resembles the nurturing mother than the strong patriarchal father. While the national organization 
leadership need to coordinate and represent the whole movement, their primary goal should be to 
nurture the empowerment of the grassroots and foster democracy and non-elitism within the 
whole movement. 
*       Help activists evolve from protestors to long-term social change agents. Provide social 
change agent training, which includes not only nonviolence but all the skills for understanding 
and organizing successful social change movements. Powerholders 
*       Continue a hardline strategy, including escalating their policies to prove that they are in 
charge and that both the movement and public have no effect. 
 
*       Infiltrate the movement to get intelligence and to confuse, disrupt, and discredit the new 
activism. Agent provocateurs promote wild schemes, violence, structurelessness, 
disorganization, rebelliousness, machismo, and schemes to dominate organizations. 
 
Public 
The general populace experiences dissonance, not knowing who or what to believe. While many 
agree with the movement's challenges, they also fear siding with dissidents and losing the 
security of the powerholders and status quo. The alternatives are unclear to them. The general 
citizenry is about evenly divided, 50 percent to 50 percent, between the powerholders and the 
movement. Movement violence, rebelliousness, and seeming anti-Americanism turn people off 




The overall goal is to help activists become empowered and move on to Stage Six, to catch up 
with their movement. They need to learn what the long road of success looks like, and how far 
they have come along that road. Some specific goals are to help activists: 
*       become strategists by using a framework such as MAP, 
*       form political and personal support groups, 
*       adopt nonviolence, 
*       adopt empowerment models of organization and leadership, and 
*       move from protesters and long-life social change agents. 
 
Pitfalls 
The chief pitfalls of this stage that must be overcome are: 
*       Disempowerment-feeling the movement is losing when it is succeeding 
*       The "tyranny of structurelessness" and anti-leadership 
*       Rebellion, machismo, and violence 
*       Despair, burnout, and dropout 
 
Conclusion 
The crisis of identity and powerless is a personal crisis for activists. After the experience of a 
movement in take-off stage, their view of the world and themselves is transformed. They come 
to realize that the problem is more serious than they had thought, the governmental institutions, 
powerbrokers, and democratic processes which they thought would help solve social problems 
were actually part of the problem, and that the problem can only be resolved if they are part of 
the solution. Rather than feeling depressed and powerless, activists now need to recognize the 
power and success of themselves and their movement. The need to realize that their movement 
has successfully progressed to Stage Six, to the majority opinion stage, and they need to catch up 
to it by finding a role for themselves and the group in waging Stage Six. 
CASE STUDY: THE AMERICAN ANTI-NUCLEAR ENERGY MOVEMENT 
Stage Five: 1978 Plus 
While anti-nuclear movement progressed to Stage Six in 1979, many of the new wave activists 
got stuck in Stage Five, beginning in 1978. They believed that their movement was ineffective 
and dying. Not one reactor was permanently stopped by nonviolent blockades, and attendance at 
demonstrations dropped rather than increasing exponentially as was believed to be necessary. 
They did not count as important their successes-that in two years they created a new nationwide 
grassroots-based social movement, a majority of the public questioned nuclear energy, the public 
was being educated, and nuclear energy was put in the public spotlight and on society's agenda. 
 
These activists chiefly saw that reactors continued to be built and started up. They discounted 
that there were no new reactor orders, dozens of plant cancellations, and rapidly dropping 
number of nuclear reactors being built and on order. They judged that their movement was losing 
because it had not yet won, not by how well it was progressing along the long road of success. 
Consequently, many activists, feeling powerless and despondent, burned out and dropped out. 
Others, still believing in the romantic myth that the nuclear energy era was to be stopped by 
forceful resistance, started "militant" groups such as the Coalition for Direct Actions. This 
strategy died, though, after several years. 
 
Many of these activists joined demonstrations during re-trigger events, such as the 1979 Three 
Mile Island accident, and most soon joined the Nuclear Freeze or non-intervention movements 
when they achieved take-off stage in the early 1980s. 
 
 
STAGE SIX: MAJORITY PUBLIC SUPPORT 
The movement must consciously undergo a transformation from spontaneous protest, operating 
in a short-term crisis, to a long-term popular struggle to achieve positive social change. It needs 
to win over the neutrality, sympathies, opinions, and even support of an increasingly larger 
majority of the populace and involve many of them in the process of opposition and change. The 
central agency of opposition must slowly change from the new wave activists and groups to the 
great majority of nonpolitical populace, the PPOs, and the mainstream political forces as they are 
convinced to agree with the movement's position. The majority stage is a long process of eroding 
the social, political, and economic supports that enable the powerholders to continue their 
policies. It is a slow process of social transformation that create a new social and political 
consensus, reversing those of normal times. 
 
Although movements need to organize both nationally and locally, they are only as powerful as 
the power of their grassroots. All the national offices in Washington, D.C., The Movement 
Action Plan 27 can do is "cash in" on the social and political gains created at the community 
level all over the country. The movement's chief goal, therefore, is to nurture, support, and 
empower grassroots activists and groups. Finally, activists also need to have a grand strategy for 
waging Stage Six majority movements to win positive social changes against the strong 
opposition of the powerholders. 
 
Opposition 
The opposition needs to wage a Stage Six strategy. Too often strategy has meant a calendar of 
events, an assorted number of unconnected campaigns, and reactions to new governmental 
policies. A Stage Six strategy includes a set of strategic programs, new organizational and 
leadership models, and an overall grand strategy. 
 
Strategic Programs 
*       Ongoing low-intensity local organizing. The key to Stage Six success ultimately is the 
ongoing, day-in and day-out basic efforts of grassroots local activists-public speaking, 
information tables at supermarkets, leafleting, yard sales, and so on-all involving face-to-face 
education of citizens by their peers and keeping the issue before the public. 
*       Massive public education and conversion. The basic purpose of the movement in this stage 
is to educate, convert, and involve all segments of the population. This is accomplished through a 
broad variety of means, including the mass media. Most important, however, are direct contacts 
through the low-intensity activities at the local level, through sidewalk tables, demonstrations, 
leaflets, petitions, house meetings, literature, and bumper stickers. The issue needs to be re-
defined to show how it directly affects everyone's values and self-interests and what they can do 
about it. 
*       Build a broad-based pluralized movement. The movement needs to include all segments of 
the population through coalitions, networks, co-sponsorship of events and petitions, and directly 
involving all constituency groups, example, unemployed, Blacks, workers, teachers, Hispanics, 
religious, women, students, etc. This includes movement organizations within each constituency 
such as Women for Peace and Teachers for Social Responsibility. In addition, the movement 
needs groups in all three categories-professional opposition organizations, new wave grassroots, 
and principled dissent. The different movement organizations must be allies with each other, 
overcoming the tendency towards self-righteousness, anti-mosity, and divisiveness. 
*       Renewed use of mainstream political and social institutions. As the movement wins larger 
majorities of public opinion, mainstream channels (e.g., Congress, city councils, officials, 
election campaigns, candidates, courts, official commissions and hearings, and ballot referenda) 
are used with increasing effectiveness. While they serve to build the movement-keeping the issue 
in the public spotlight, educating the public, and so on-they also win actual victories on demands 
where there is big public support in places where the movement is strongest and the central 
powerholders weakest, often at the local and state levels. These successes serve to build the 
movement's success from the ground up over the coming years. For example, the opposition to 
U.S. direct military invasion of Nicaragua has been (at least temporarily) successful at the 
Congressional level, but not at the central powerholder level of the Reagan administration. And 
nuclear energy plans have been halted at the local and state levels, while the central government 
and nuclear industry maintain their policies favoring increased use of nuclear power. Also, the 
opposition to nuclear weapons has been built into a national consensus, which is putting 
enormous pressure on the national government. Even President Reagan has tried to appear to be 
ending nuclear weapons, especially U.S. missiles in Europe, where there is overwhelming public 
opposition. 
 
*       Nonviolent rallies, demonstrations, and campaigns, especially at critical times and places. 
Although the movement now includes a wide range of programs, it must continue to have 
nonviolent actions, rallies, and campaigns, with occasional civil disobedience. While nonviolent 
actions should be held at traditional times and places, such as on Hiroshima and Nagasaki days, 
they should also occur at critical times and places, such as when Congress votes on aid to the 
contras, when dictators visit, and during re-trigger events, such as the Chernobyl accident. 
Because people are involved in so many different programs in this stage, and many no longer see 
the purpose of some nonviolent actions, the numbers participating in any specific national or 
local demonstration usually drop below those of the take-off stage (with the exception of some 
new crises). However, because there are nonviolent actions happening in hundreds of local 
communities around the country when movements are in the majority stage, the nationwide total 
number participating in demonstrations actually increases enormously in this stage. 
 
Although nonviolent actions sometimes do help win immediate successes, such as change a city 
council member's or Congressperson's vote, their chief purpose is to help achieve many of the 
goals of Stages Four to Six, such as keeping the issue in the public spotlight and providing a 
platform for the movement to educate the public. 
*       Citizen involvement programs. The movement needs to develop programs in which large 
numbers of common citizens can become actively involved in programs that challenge current 
traditions, policies, and laws, while simultaneously carrying out the society's values and the 
movement's alternatives. This empowers the movement and citizens because they can carry out 
their values and goals without waiting for the powerholders to make the decision for them. This 
is quite different form isolated alternative "demonstration" projects. Citizen involvement 
programs put large numbers of people directly in contradiction with official policies. Some 
excellent massive citizen involvement programs of today's movements include the sanctuary 
movement, in which local churches and towns throughout the country provide official sanctuary 
for Central American political refugees; the thousands of "citizen diplomats" traveling to Russia 
and Nicaragua; sending tools and aid to Nicaragua in violation of U.S. sanctions; and nuclear 
free towns, counties, and even countries, such as New Zealand and Palau. These programs 
educate and convert the public, demonstrate the alternative values and policies sought, 
demonstrate the extent of popular opposition, undercut the authority of the powerholders to carry 
out their policy goals, and build change from the bottom up. 
*       Respond to new trigger events, such as the Three-Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents, to 
again put the issue in the public spotlight, educate the public to new levels of awareness, build 
the movement organizations, and increase the pressure for change. 
 
New empowerment organization and leadership model 
Movement organizations must switch from the "loose" to the "empowerment" model. The loose 
organization model was highly appropriate at the beginning of the new movement. It allowed for 
creative, spontaneous activities, which included civil disobedience and quick, flexible, and direct 
decision-making by all involved. But after six months the loose structure rapidly becomes a 
liability. It becomes too inefficient, people burn out from long meetings, the most experienced 
and strongest activists become dominant leaders, new people have difficulty becoming full 
participants, and the whole organization evolves into a informal hierarchy. The empowerment 
organization model is the name given to a new structure that activists must construct themselves, 
in which they try to maximize the advantages and minimize the disadvantages of the hierarchical 
and loose models. Its goal is to be participatory democratic, efficient, flexible, and capable of 
lasting over the long haul. This requires more structures, but structures that assure these 
principles. 
 
This is a critical time for the offices and staff of national movement organizations. While they 
need to advocate practical policies of "real politics", maintain the organization, and operate in 
bureaucracies (no matter how "collective"), they must prevent the organization from becoming a 
new POO, and the staff from becoming new movement elites. The primary goal is to serve, 
nurture, and empower the grassroots and to ensure that internal participatory democracy is 
carried out. The staff model must continue to be that of nurturing mothers, not dominant 
patriarchs. When the national staff behaves as if they are the movement, the grassroots dries up 
and the movement loses its power. 
 
Grand Strategy 
Activists need to develop a "grand strategy" for waging social movements in Stage Six. Lacking 
a viable strategy, most activists are unable to see a relationship between their day-to-day 
activities and the accomplishment of the movement's goals. Some of the key elements are the 
following: 
*       Keep the issue in the public spotlight and on society's agenda over time. Keep the policies 
and conditions which violate the values, interests, and beliefs of the majority of the populace in 
the public spotlight. Over time, this helps build the social and political conditions for change 
because it helps fulfill Robert Jay Lifton's view that the way to get rid of a social delusion is to 
keep telling the truth. The present social movements against nuclear weapons and in opposition 
to U.S. intervention in Central America should recognize as tremendous success the fact that 
these issues have been kept in the public spotlight and on society's social and political agendas 
for a number of years. 
*       Identify all of the movement's key goals and identify which stage each is in and develop 
strategies to achieve them. Identify the movement's full range of demands, from the very specific 
to the general, such as end all nuclear weapons, stop nuclear testing, stop Star Wars, and stop 
U.S. Euromissiles. Strategies, submovements, and campaigns need to be developed for each of 
these major demands. Activists should identify which MAP stage the movement is in for each of 
these demands and develop strategies, submovements, and campaigns to achieve each major 
demand. For example, stop U.S. direct invasion of Nicaragua might be in Stage Seven, official 
support for the contras in Stage Six, and a positive Contadora peace resolution for all of Central 
America is possibly just in Stage Three. 
*       Counter the powerholders' strategy. The movement needs to identify the powerholders' 
long-term goals, strategies, and programs and develop counterstrategies against each one. For 
example, the U.S. is considering invading Nicaragua, supporting the contra's war against 
Nicaragua, preventing a meaningful peaceful Contadora resolution, etc. The movement needs to 
develop campaigns to prevent the government's achieving each of these objectives. 
*       Beyond reforms: propose alternatives, larger demands, and a new paradigm. The 
movement now needs not only to protest present policies but also to propose specific 
alternatives. In the process of struggle, people act their way into thinking, and they learn that the 
problem is much bigger than they had thought. They come to realize that their original concerns 
were merely symptoms of much bigger and deeper problems; consequently, the movement needs 
to make larger demands. This ultimately includes the necessity for a whole new worldview or 
paradigm. The movement against Cruise and Pershing 2 missiles in Europe, for example, 
realized that they needed to remove all nuclear weapons from East and West Europe. This has 
led a new worldview of a nuclear free East and West Europe that will become increasingly 
neutral and independent of the Soviet-United States superpower bloc system. 
*       Guide the movement through the dynamics of conflict with the powerholders. Waging a 
social movement is similar to playing chess. The movement and powerholders constantly engage 
in moves and countermoves to win the public and build conditions to support their own position. 
The movement tries to build moral, political, and economic conditions that will erode the support 
that enables the powerholders to continue their policies. The powerholders keep changing their 
policies to keep their capacity to maintain the status quo. The movement's goal is to keep 
weakening the powerholders' position and raising the price that they must pay to continue their 
policies. The Reagan administration, for example, seemed about to invade Nicaragua in 1984, 
but the anti-intervention movement raised public opposition to a new level. The government then 
switched its chief focus to supporting the contras, but the movement made this illegal by helping 
pass the Boland amendment, thereby forcing the government to undertake the high-risk policies 
of illegal and unconstitutional covert aid through Ollie North. This has weakened President 
Reagan's capacity to wage his policies in Central America as well as elsewhere. 
 
Powerholders 
The powerholders launch a hardline conflict management strategy to defend their policies, which 
included the following: 
*       Promote new rhetoric and myths and re-emphasize the threat of outside demons, such as 
terrorism and Communism, to try to rally an increasingly skeptical public. 
*       Increase their counter-movement strategy to gather intelligence; discredit the movement; 
cause internal disruption, control, and steer the movement; preempt it by claiming to do the 
movement's program (e.g., "Star Wars will end nuclear weapons"); and try to co-opt the 
movement under mainstream political control (e.g., co-sponsor grossly watered down 
Congressional bills). 
*       Engage in the dynamics of conflict with the movement by switching strategies, stance, and 
policies as needed, for example, from invading Nicaragua with U.S. troops, to supporting the 
proxy contras and waging low-intensity warfare against Nicaragua. 
*       Publicly appear to be engaged in a meaningful "negotiation process", while actually 
carrying out operative policies and doctrines without giving up any important advantages. 
Powerholders keep pronouncing that their policies are correct and winning. Finally, splits begin 
happening within the power structure, as over time pressure from the new social and political 
consensus force increasing portions of the mainstream political, economic and social elites to 
switch their position, even openly oppose the policies of the central powerholders in order to 
protect their own self-interests. The issue is now hotly contested within Congress, the 
Administration, and all other political levels. 
 
Public 
Public opinion opposing the powerholders' policies grows to as much as 65 percent within a few 
years, and then, over many years, slowly swells to a large majority of up to 85 percent. The 
populace, however, is evenly split over wanting a change in the status quo. Half fear the 
alternatives more than they oppose the present conditions and policies. By the early 1970s, for 
example, 83 percent of Americans called for an end to the Vietnam war, and currently 65 percent 
oppose aid to the contras and U.S. military intervention in Central America. 
 
Goals 
*       Keep the issue and the powerholders' values violations in the public spotlight and on 
society's agenda. 
*       Switch from only crisis protest to waging protracted social struggle to achieve positive 
social change. 
*       Gear efforts to the public to keep winning a bigger majority opinion. 
*       Involve large numbers of the populace in programs at the grassroots level. 
*       Propose alternatives, more demands, and a new paradigm. 
*       Have activists able to use a strategic framework such as MAP. 32 Bill Moyer 
*       Adopt empowerment organizational and leadership models. 
 
Pitfalls 
*       Activists become stuck in the protest stage. 
*       Movement violence, rebelliousness, and macho radicalism. 
*       Believing that the movement is losing and local efforts are futile. 
*       National organizations and leadership disenfranchise grassroots activists by dominating the 
movement. 
*       Cooptation by powerholders through collusion and compromise. 
*       Political sects dominate the movement organizations. 
 
Conclusions 
Over many years, perhaps decades, public opinion against the powerholders' policies swells to an 
overwhelming majority of up to 85 percent, as was opposition to the Vietnam War. Almost every 
sector of society eventually wants to end the problem and current policies-most politicians, the 
Democratic Party, celebrities, professionals, students, Middle America, youth, the unemployed, 
local governments, and the general population. But strangely, nothing seems to change. The 
problem continues, Congress seems unable to make decisive votes, and the central powerholders 
continue their policies, although with cosmetic changes. Moreover the movement appears to be 
in a lull. There are demonstrations, meetings, and activists, but they seem small, routine, and 
mechanical, as the movement's position has been adopted by the mainstream of society. Over the 
years, however, the weight of the massive public opposition, along with the defection of many 
elites, eventually takes its toll. The political price that the powerholders have to pay to maintain 
their policies grows to become an untenable liability. 
 
CASE STUDY: THE AMERICAN ANTI-NUCLEAR ENERGY MOVEMENT 
Stage Six: 1979 to 1992 
From 1979 to 1987, the anti-nuclear energy movement has been progressing in the majority 
opposition stage. Public opinion against nuclear energy keeps growing bigger. Seventy-eight 
percent of Americans now oppose building more reactors, and many local and state officials 
fight against starting up even completed local reactors and proposed waste sites. Similar 
majorities exist in Europe, where 50 percent of citizens favor shutting down operating plants. 
 
The nuclear industry continued in sharp decline. Although the number of licensed reactors has 
increased to 98, the total number of reactors operating and under construction has dropped from 
195 to 123. There have been no effective new orders for 14 years, and over 100 reactors orders 
have been cancelled-even ones that are 50 percent complete. The secrets of the powerholders' 
operative nuclear energy policies are now known by many citizens. Nuclear energy is 
outrageously expensive, dangerous, and unnecessary; and it is tied to nuclear weapons, which 
manypeople oppose. Trigger events such as the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents have 
also spurred public opposition. If the present trend of no new orders and reactor cancellations 
continues, nuclear energy will die out early in the next century as existing reactors come to the 
end of their 25-year life expectancy. 
 
The federal government, both political parties, and the nuclear industry still promote nuclear 
energy and want hundreds of operating reactors by the year 2000. The federal bureaucracy, for 
example, subsidized nuclear energy through tax breaks and outlays amounting to $56 billion in 
1984 alone. Also, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is now trying to drop its rule 
requiring local government involvement in establishing emergency evacuation plans as a 
prerequisite for reactor licensing. The NRC is attempting this because the local and state 
governments are preventing the licensing of the completed Shoreham and Seabrook reactors by 
refusing to be part of the evacuation plans. The pro-nuclear strategy now is to streamline 
licensing nuclear into one easy step, develop new light-water reactors, respond positively to new 
accidents, develop a social and political consensus through propaganda, bail out threatened 
reactors, open waste sites, deregulate the utilities, develop space weapons that use lots of nuclear 
reactors, and regionalize electrical production to get around state controls. The anti-nuclear 
strategy is to educate the public, respond to new trigger events with demonstrations and 
education, and counter the pro-nuclear strategies of saving the nuclear industry by opposing rate 
hikes, bailouts, rule changes, and so on. For example, the movement is presently challenging the 
NRC's proposed changes in its evacuation plan rules which would permit the Seabrook and 
Shoreham reactors to become fully licensed. In addition, the movement is advocating the new 
soft-energy path of conservation, cogeneration, and solar power to replace the hard-energy path. 
Much of the movement's efforts are now being waged by POOs and local groups using the 
mainstream institutions and channels, such as the courts, state utilities, legislation, referenda, and 
electoral politics. 
STAGE SEVEN: SUCCESS 
Stage Seven begins when the long process of building opposition reaches a new plateau in which 
the new social consensus turns the tide of power against the powerholders and begins an 
endgame process leading to the movement's success. The Stage Seven process can take three 
forms: dramatic showdown, quiet showdown, or attrition. 
*       Dramatic showdown resembles the take off stage. A sudden trigger event sparks a 
mobilization of broad popular opposition and a social crisis, but this time the overwhelming 
coercive force, in a relatively short time, changes policies or leadership. This was achieved in 
each issue of the early 1960s civil rights movement, such as when the Selma march started 
President Johnson and the Congress into motion that led to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 within 
a few months. Activists usually feel that they won and had played an important role in achieving 
success. 
 
*       Quiet showdown. Realizing that they can no longer continue their present policies, the 
powerholders launch a face-saving endgame process of "victorious retreat". Rather than admit 
defeat, they proclaim victory and start a publicly recognized process of changing their policies 
and conditions to those demanded by the movement and social consensus. The powerholders try 
to take credit for this "victory", even though they were forced to reverse their previously hardline 
policies, while activists often have difficulty seeing their role in this success. A current example 
is President Reagan's efforts to reach an agreement with Gorbachev to end Euromissiles. 
*       Attrition is when success is quietly and seemingly invisibly achieved in a long process 
which could take decades, in which social and political machinery slowly evolves new policies 
and conditions, such as the present winding down of nuclear energy in the United States. During 
the attrition process, activists usually have even more difficulty recognizing the successful 
endgame process and the fact that they had a crucial role in causing it. In all three forms, once 
the endgame process starts, final success is not guaranteed. Until the change is finally actually 
accomplished, the situation can be reversed. Stage Seven involves a continual struggle, but one 
in which the opposition is on the offensive until the specific goal is won. 
 
Opposition 
The chief engine for change switches from the "movement" to traditional progressives; the 
"nonpolitical" majority of the population; and mainstream political, social, and economic groups 
and institutions. The public becomes involved in a broad range of social actions which keep the 
spotlight on the issues, reveals the evils of the present policies , and creates real political and 
economic penalties. Most of the business and political powerholders are forced to defect from 
their ties to the status quo, because it is in their self-interest. The penalty for defending the status 
quo has become bigger than for accepting the alternative. The politicians will face hostile voters 
at their next election, and the business community can suffer loss of profits or business 
community can suffer loss of profits or business through boycotts, sanctions, and disruption of 
the marketplace. There sometimes is a general, worldwide insurrection which isolates the central 
powerholders and their dwindling support. 
 
The opposition's efforts and feelings vary according to the endgame form: 
*       In dramatic showdown, the movement more resembles the take-off stage, in which it plays 
a massive, publicly obvious role involving mass-demonstrations in a time of crisis leading to 
success in a relatively short time, such as the toppling of Marcos, following the election process, 
or the achievement of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, five months after the Selma campaign. 
*       In quiet showdown, the movement continues its strategy and of both take-off and Stage 
Six, and while still publicly active, activists need to work hard to recognize the victory and their 
own role. 
*       In attrition, the endgame process is often not recognized as success, the movement's role is 
much less visible, and much of the opposition's efforts are carried out through the work of elites 
and the POOs. 
 
Powerholders 
The viability of the central powerholders' policies is eroded economically and politically. The 
majority of powerholders join the opposition view, while the central powerholders are isolated 
and eventually defeated. The central powerholders are: 
*       forced into making fatal mistakes, such as President Nixon's ordered Watergate break-ins 
and other "dirty tricks" against the opposition, or when President Reagan felt forced to violate 
the Boland amendment through illegal covert aid to the contras; 
*       increasingly prevented from doing what is fully required to successfully carry out their 
policies, such as when the Pentagon was prevented from carrying out programs it felt were 
necessary to win the Vietnam War; and 
*       resort to extreme emergency acts of political and economic decrees and repression, which 
serve only to spur the opposition. The economic, social, and political penalties erode the base for 
support of the powerholders to either continue their policies or remain in office. The central 
powerholders have three different endgame strategies, according to the type of ending: 
*       Custer's last stand (in dramatic showdown), in which they hold out until either their 
policies are defeated in the mainstream political process, such as in the courts, Congress, or 
referenda, or they lose their office or position through elections or mass social actions and 
pressures; 
*       Victorious retreat (in quiet showdown), in which the powerholders lose on the issue, but in 
reversing their policies declare victory for themselves; or of 
*       Persistent stubbornness (in attrition), in which they hold out in an increasingly losing cause 
over many years, until one of the above two endings occur. 
 
Public 
The public demands change. The opposition to the powerholders is now so overwhelming that 
the whole issue is publicly recognized as the "good guys vs. bad guys". One is either for decency 
or for President Marcos, apartheid, and the Vietnam War. While a majority opposition has 
existed for some years, up to now the mass population was not willing to act on their beliefs. 
They had not acted because they: 
*       felt powerless, 
*       did not know what to do, 
*       were not called to action by a trigger event and crisis, and 
*       feared the alternative (e.g., Communism, or the unknown) more than they desired change. 
 
Citizens are so repulsed that their desire to end present policies and conditions overtakes their 
worry about the consequences of the alternative. 
 
They are ready to vote, demonstrate, and even support the central powerholders in changing 
present policies. For example, people want an end to nuclear weapons more than they fear Soviet 
attack and takeover. 
 
Goals 
The movement's goals for this stage include: 
*       Wage a successful "endgame" strategy to achieve one or more demands. 
*       Have activists recognize the success and their own role in it. 
*       Raise larger issues and propose alternative paradigms. 
*       Create new decentralized centers of power based on more participatory structures and an 
empowered public. 
*       Continue the movement. 
 
Pitfalls 
The movement needs to avoid: 
*       compromising too many values and key demands; 
*       achieving minor reforms without building toward basic social change; 
*       having activists feel dismayed and powerless because they do not recognize success and the 
movement's role in a successful endgame; and 
*       having apparent final victory end the movement. 
 
Conclusion 
The movement finally achieves one or more of its demands. It now needs to address some hard 
questions: What is success? What needs to be done next? The movement needs to recognize 
successes achieved, follow up on the demands won, raise larger issues, focus on other demands 
which are in various stages, and propose larger alternatives and a new paradigm. 
CASE STUDY: THE AMERICAN ANTI-NUCLEAR ENERGY MOVEMENT 
Stage Seven: 1993 Plus 
The anti-nuclear energy movement can win either by attrition or dramatic showdown. If present 
trends continue, nuclear energy will end slowly by prolonged decline of attrition early in the next 
century as described in the previous stage. This will require continuous opposition by the 
movement to the public and private powerholders' attempts to revive the industry through 
government institutions. The central powerholders will continue to promote nuclear energy until 
nuclear energy becomes completely untenable economically or political, or until they lose office. 
 
On the other hand, nuclear energy could come to a dramatic showdown ending as the result of a 
major nuclear accident as in the following scenario: In the Summer of 1993, an accident (some 
think it was the first act of terrorism within the United States) at a nuclear plant located in a 
densely populated metropolitan area in Northeast causes devastation far greater than that of 
Chernobyl. All nuclear plants in the U.S. are ordered shut down pending an investigation. The 
fate of nuclear energy is at the top of the nation's agenda for the next fifteen months. Eighty-five 
percent of Americans oppose the restart of the reactors. Finally, just before its end-of-the-year 
break, Congress votes to end nuclear energy. 
 
Both of these success options require that the general populace understands and accepts an 
alternative means for meeting the nation's electrical energy needs. By that time, the movement 
must have educated and convinced the populace that the nation can switch to the soft energy 
paradigm. 
 
STAGE EIGHT: CONTINUING THE STRUGGLE 
The success achieved in Stage Seven is not the end of the struggle but a basis for continuing that 
struggle and creating new beginnings. 
 
Opposition 
The movement has to continue the struggle in five different ways: 
*       Celebrate success. The successes of Stage Seven and the movement's role in achieving 
them should be clearly recognized by activists. 
*       Follow-up. There needs to be follow-up, mainly by the POOs, at the local and national 
level (1) to make sure that the new promises, laws, and policies are actually carried out (e.g., 
after the 1965 Voting Rights Act a major effort was required to assure that Blacks were actually 
allowed to vote); (2) to achieve additional successes, which are now possible under the new 
political conditions and legal mandate; and (3) to resist backlash which might reverse the new 
gains. 
*       Work on achieving other demands. The movement needs to focus on achieving other 
demands, which are probably in earlier MAP stages. After the civil rights movement 
desegregated restaurants in 1960, for example, the whole MAP stages process was repeated with 
successive movements to achieve integrated buses, equal public accommodations, voting rights, 
and work to end poverty. 
*       New social consciousness, issues, and movements. The modern student and women's 
movements emerged out of the civil rights and anti-Vietnam War movements. 
*       Beyond reform to social change. Social movements need to go beyond immediate reforms 
to build toward fundamental structural changes by (1) creating empowered people who become 
life-long social change agents, and not just one issue protesters; (2) creating ongoing grassroots 
political organizations and networks; (3) broadening the analysis, issues, and goals of 
movements; (4) propose new alternatives and worldviews or paradigms that put forward new 
political and social systems, not just oppose symptoms. 
 
Powerholders 
Governmental bureaucracies are supposed to carry out new laws and directives but could drag 
their feet and even fail to follow through. While most powerholders will be part of the new social 
and political consensus and try to carry out the new laws and policies, some may counterattack to 
reverse the new successes, as the Reagan administration did in ignoring the Boland amendment 
and continuing its support of the contras after 1984. 
 
Public 
A new social consensus of about 80 percent of the populace supports the favorable resolution of 
the movement's demand and the resulting new policies and conditions. The new demands on 
which the movement now begins focusing are supported by between 10 and 80 percent of the 
public and are different MAP stages. 
 
Goals 
The movement's goals are to assure that the demands achieved are maintained and to circle back 
to focus the movement on other demands. 
 
Pitfalls 
The chief hazards of Stage Eight are having the new successes either inadequately implemented 
or revoked from backlash. 
 
Conclusion 
There is no end. There is only the continuing struggle, acted out in cycles of social movements. 
The process of winning one set of demands creates new levels of citizen consciousness and 
empowerment, and generates new movements on new demands and issues. 
 
Peoples' movements move the world further along the path towards more fully meeting the 
spiritual, physical, social, and political needs of humanity. Moreover, the very process of being 
fully involved in the struggle of peoples' movements contributes to peoples' political and spiritual 
fulfillment. Activists are part of the emerging people-power movements around the world. 
People worldwide are struggling to transform themselves and the world from the present era of 
superpowers, materialism, environmental breakdown, disenfranchisement, abject poverty amidst 
opulence, and militarism, to a new, more human era of democracy, freedom, justice, self-
determination, human rights, peaceful coexistence, preservation of the environment, and the 
meeting of basic human needs. 
 
Consequently, the long-term impacts are more important than their immediate successes. The 
civil rights movement, for example, created a new positive image of Blacks among themselves 
and whites, established nonviolent action as a means to achieve people power, directly spun off 
the student and anti-Vietnam War movements, and inspired peoples' movements got the 
American people, for the first time, to challenge and change American foreign policy and created 
the "Vietnam syndrome" in which the American people oppose the century old policy of U.S. 
military intervention in Latin America to achieve the interests of American powerholders. Social 
movements are also contagious: Philippines people's movement spurred similar efforts in Haiti, 
Chile, and now South Korea. 
 
CASE STUDY: THE AMERICAN ANTI-NUCLEAR ENERGY MOVEMENT  
Stage Eight: Through 2025 
 
If the nuclear energy endgame is that of attrition, the movement will have to continue its 
vigilance and opposition indefinitely into the future, opposing the barrage of central powerholder 
efforts to revive the nuclear energy era, until there is a total social and political consensus for 
cancelling nuclear energy and switching to a soft energy path. On the other hand, the dramatic 
showdown scenario could go as follows: The industrialized world is rocked again in 1995 by the 
report of an international commission that was set up following the 1993 accident to predict the 
world's energy future into the next century. Its findings went far beyond the nuclear energy issue. 
The study included many of the coming crises that had been documented over the past 30 years. 
It showed that the current rates of fossil fuel (oil, wood, and coal) energy production would cause 
many catastrophes by the year 2025. The greenhouse effect would raise the Earth's temperature 
reducing the agricultural production and creating the loss of many coastlines from the melting of 
glacial ice; the Earth's ozone layer would be reduced, causing hundreds of millions of additional 
skin cancers; forests would be devastated by acid rain; the oceans would be threatened; and the 
world's production of oil would peak and drop by 50 percent, as the available oil sources dry up, 
and oil production over the next five years would drop while prices skyrocketed. 
 
Nations throughout the world hastily turn away from the hard energy policies based on high 
consumption of nuclear and fossil fuels and begin crash efforts to adopt soft energy strategies. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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The MAP Model for Organizing Social Movements 
By Bill Moyer, JoAnn McAllister, Mary Lou Finley and Steve Soifer 
Citizen activism has achieved many positive results. But the road to success for social 
movements is often complex, usually lasting many years, with few guides for evaluating the 
precise stage of a movement's evolution to determine the best way forward. 
Doing Democracy provides both a theory and working model for understanding and analyzing 
social movements, ensuring that they are successful in the long term. Beginning with an 
overview of social movement theory and the MAP (Movement Action Plan) model, Doing 
Democracy outlines the eight stages of social movements, the four roles of activists, and case 
studies from the civil rights, anti-nuclear energy, Central America, gay/lesbian, women's health, 
and globalization movements. 
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